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ment. The optimal risky portfolio share becomes flat in age due to the resolution of
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1 Introduction
Several findings in the macro-labor literature indicate that long-term unemployment may
lead to a loss of human capital. In this paper, we embed the possibility of entering long-
term unemployment with permanent consequences on human capital in a life-cycle model
of consumption and portfolio choice. We model working life careers as a three-state Markov
chain driving the transitions between employment, short-term and long-term unemploy-
ment states, as in Bremus and Kuzin (2014), calibrated to broadly match recently observed
U.S. labor market features. Importantly, we allow for human capital loss during unem-
ployment. When unemployed, individuals receive benefits but simultaneously experience a
cut in the permanent component of labor income which captures diminished future income
prospects. This represents the observed permanent earning losses (Arulampalam, Booth
and Taylor, 2000; Arulampalam, 2001; Schmieder, von Wachter and Bender, 2016) due to
skill loss during long-term unemployment (Neal, 1995; Edin and Gustavsson, 2008).
Potential losses of human capital considerably lower the optimal portfolio share invested
in stocks with respect to the case of no unemployment risk. Importantly, optimal stock
investment is no longer decreasing with age but remains remarkably flat over the whole
working life, in line with the evidence on U.S. portfolios (Amkeriks and Zeldes, 2004). On
the contrary, traditional life-cycle models imply that households should reduce exposure
to risky stocks as they approach retirement (Bodie, Merton and Samuelson, 1992; Viceira
2001; Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout 2005). The reason is that human capital provides a
hedge against shocks to stock returns, making financial risk bearing more attractive. In-
vestment in stocks should therefore be relatively high at the beginning of working careers,
when human capital is large relative to accumulated financial wealth, and then gradually
falling until retirement as human capital decreases relative to financial wealth. This model
implication is embodied in the popular financial advice of a stock exposure steadily de-
creasing with age, the so-called “age rule”. In our model with human capital loss, such
effect is instead moderated by the resolution of uncertainty concerning labor and pension
income, as the worker safely comes close to retirement age. Since the risk of long term un-
employment falls together with human capital as retirement approaches, the resolution of
uncertainty compensates the hedge effect and the optimal investment in stocks is relatively
flat over the life-cycle.
2
Optimal risky portfolios are highly heterogeneous in models without human capital loss.
On the contrary, the permanent consequences of long-term unemployment shrink the het-
erogeneity of optimal portfolio choices across agents characterized by different employment
histories. In the face of possible human capital depreciation, individuals accumulate sub-
stantially more financial wealth during working life to buffer possible adverse labor market
outcomes. Optimal early consumption consequently falls, becoming higher during both
late working life and retirement years. The working-year responses to unemployment risk,
including the flat age profile in stock investment, are remarkably robust to changes in
preferences on the intertemporal correlation of shocks. In fact, allowing for Epstein-Zin
preferences only causes slower wealth decumulation and less risk taking during retirement
years. Similarly, an increase in the correlation between stock returns and labor income
shocks leaves the flat shape of optimal equity investment during working age unaltered,
only increasing the portfolio share allocated to the riskfree asset. Thus, it is the human
capital loss the first order determinant of the optimal financial risk-taking at different ages.
The above results obtain in calibrations to U.S. data: in particular, the implied uncon-
ditional probabilities of being short-run unemployed (3.78%) and long-run unemployed
(1.72%) are set at the levels observed in the U.S. after the Great Recession. The human
capital loss amounts to some 25% of all future expected earnings only in the occurrence
of a long-term unemployment spell, in a calibration that captures the relatively slow re-
employment process experienced by U.S. workers. We select the magnitude of the human
capital loss during long-term unemployment considering both the total loss of human cap-
ital for the fraction of workers abandoning the labor force, and the partial loss for those
who are able to find a job. Our results go through even when the human capital loss
parameter is reduced as far as 15% of future expected earnings, and when the probability
of moving into long-term unemployment from an initial unemployment state is reduced by
half (from 0.15 to 0.075).
Previous life-cycle models with unemployment and self-insurance leave the observed age
pattern of stock holding during working life largely unexplained. Some versions of the
life-cycle model account for the risk of being unemployed by introducing a (small) posi-
tive probability of zero labor income: in these models unemployment risk affects income
only during the unemployment spell with no consequences on subsequent earnings ability
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(Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout, 2005) even when unemployment is persistent (Bremus and
Kuzin, 2014). With no permanent consequence on subsequent earnings ability, the stock
holding is still counterfactually decreasing in age till retirement although, on average, lower
than what obtained without unemployment risk. Thus, it is the possibility of human cap-
ital loss entailed by long–term unemployment -rather than unemployment per se - that
restrains risk-taking by the young and middle-aged workers.
Several papers already investigate alternative hypotheses that may deliver the relatively
flat stock profile observed in the data, departing from the pattern implied by traditional
life-cycle models. Some of this prior research already relate the flattening of the age profile
of stock investment to the resolution of uncertainty over working life. Hubener, Maurer and
Mitchell (2016) point to the time-varying risk of changing family status during working age
due to marriage, fertility and divorce, which affects consumption both directly and through
labor supply. In Bagliano, Fugazza and Nicodano (2014), such flattening crucially depends
on the presence of both another risky asset, besides equities, and a positive correlation
between stock returns and permanent labor income shocks. Moreover, it only appears
when risk aversion or the variance of labor income shocks are higher than in the baseline
calibration of Cocco Gomes and Maenhout (2005). Most importantly, Chang, Hong and
Karabarbounis (2018) introduce labor market uncertainty into an otherwise standard life-
cycle model. They show that the interaction between unemployment risk, occupational
uncertainty and gradual learning about earnings ability generates a moderately increasing
age profile of stock investment, with an average portfolio risky share (conditional on par-
ticipation) substantially lower than in a typical life-cycle setting. Our model complements
and strengthens their main conclusions by exploring the effects of an additional dimension
of age-dependent labor market uncertainty, namely the risk of permanent human capital
losses due to long-term unemployment, yielding an average optimal stock share below 60
percent and remarkably flat during working life. Notably, as in Chang, Hong and Karabar-
bounis (2018), our results are achieved under the assumptions of a moderate degree of risk
aversion and the absence of positive correlation between labor income and stock market
returns.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the benchmark life-cycle
model and briefly outlines the numerical solution procedure adopted. We detail the model
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calibration in Section 3 and discuss our main results in Section 4. Various robustness
checks are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The life-cycle model
We model an investor who maximizes the expected discounted utility of consumption over
her entire life and wishes to leave a bequest as well. The investor starts working at age
t0 and retires with certainty at age t0 +K. The effective length of her life, which lasts at
most T periods, is governed by age-dependent life expectancy. At each date t, the survival
probability of being alive at date t+1 is pt, the conditional survival probability at t (with
pt0−1 = 1). Investor’s i preferences at date t are described by a time-separable power utility
function:
C1−γit0
1− γ
+ Et0

 T∑
j=1
βj

j−2∏
k=0
pt0+k

(pt0+j−1C
1−γ
it0+j
1− γ
+ (1− pt0+j−1) b
(Xit0+j/b)
1−γ
1− γ
) (1)
where Cit is the level of consumption at time t, Xit is the amount of wealth the investor
leaves as a bequest to her heirs after her death, b ≥ 0 is a parameter capturing the strength
of the bequest motive, β < 1 is a utility discount factor, and γ is the constant relative risk
aversion parameter.
2.1 Labor and retirement income
During working life individuals receive exogenous stochastic earnings as compensation for
labor supplied inelastically. Working life careers are modelled as a three-state Markov chain
considering employment (e), short-term (u1) and long-term (u2) unemployment. Individual
labor market dynamics are driven by the following transition matrix:
Πst,st+1 =


piee pieu1 pieu2
piu1e piu1u1 piu1u2
piu2e piu2u1 piu2u2

 =


piee 1− piee 0
piu1e 0 1− piu1e
piu2e 0 1− piu2e

 (2)
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where pinm = Prob (st+1 = n|st = m) with n,m = e, u1, u2. If the worker is employed
at t (st = e), she continues the employment spell at t + 1 (st+1 = e) with probability
piee, otherwise she enters short-term unemployment (st+1 = u1) with probability pieu1 =
1 − piee. Since she must experience short-term unemployment prior to becoming long-
term unemployed, we set the probability of directly entering long-term unemployment at
zero, pieu2 = 0. Conditional on being short-term unemployed at t (st = u1), she exits
unemployment (st+1 = e) with probability piu1e or becomes long-term unemployed (st+1 =
u2) with probability piu1u2 = 1 − piu1e; consequently, we set piu1u1 = 0. Finally, if she is
long-term unemployed at t (st = u2), she is re-employed in the following period (st+1 = e)
with probability piu2e and remains unemployed with probability piu2u2 = 1− piu2e.
As in Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (2005), the employed individual receives a stochastic
labor income driven by permanent and transitory shocks. In each working period, labor
income Yit is generated by the following process:
Yit = HitUit t0 ≤ t ≤ t0 +K (3)
where Hit = F (t,Zit)Pit represents the permanent income component. In particular,
F (t,Zit) ≡ Fit denotes the deterministic trend component that depends on age (t) and a
vector of individual characteristics (Zit) such as gender, marital status, household compo-
sition and education. Consistent with the available empirical evidence, the logarithm of
the stochastic permanent component is assumed to follow a random walk process:
Nit = logPit = logPit−1 + ωit (4)
where ωit is distributed as N(0, σ
2
ω). Uit denotes the transitory stochastic component and
εit = log(Uit) is distributed as N(0, σ
2
ε) and uncorrelated with ωit.
In our set-up, which differs from that of Bremus and Kuzin (2014), labor income received
by the employed individual at time t depends on her past working history. In particular, we
allow unemployment and its duration to affect the permanent component of labor income,
Hit. Since the empirical evidence suggests that the longer the unemployment spell the
larger is the worker’s human capital depreciation (Schmieder, von Wachter and Bender,
2016), we let human capital loss increase with unemployment duration. Thus, after 1-year
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unemployment the permanent component Hit is equal to Hit−1 eroded by a fraction Ψ1,
and after a 2-year unemployment spell the permanent component, Hit−1, is eroded by a
fraction Ψ2, with Ψ2 > Ψ1. This introduces non-linearity into the expected permanent
labor income. In compact form, the permanent component of labor income Hit evolves
according to
Hit =


FitPit if st = e and st−1 = e
(1−Ψ1)Hit−1 if st = e and st−1 = u1
(1−Ψ2)Hit−1 if st = e and st−1 = u2
t = t0, ..., t0 +K (5)
In the short-term unemployment state (st = u1) individuals receive an unemployment ben-
efit as a fixed proportion ξ1 of the previous year permanent income Hit−1 = Fit−1Pit−1,
whereas in the long-term unemployment state (st = u2) they receive an unemployment
benefit in proportion ξ2 of Hit−2 = Fit−2Pit−2
1. Thus, the income received during unem-
ployment is
Yit =


ξ1Fit−1Pit−1 if st = u1
ξ2Fit−2Pit−2 if st = u2
t = t0, ..., t0 +K (6)
Finally, during retirement, income is certain and equal to a fixed proportion λ of the
permanent component of labor income in the last working year:
Yit = λF
(
t,Zit0+l
)
Pit0+l t0 +K < t ≤ T (7)
where retirement age is t0 + K, t0 + l is the last working period and λ is level of the
replacement rate.
2.2 Investor’s life-cycle problem
The investor maximizes the expected discounted utility over life span, by choosing the
consumption and the portfolio rules given uncertain labor income and asset returns.
1While keeping the model tractable (by allowing to get rid of one state variable Fit), this simplifying
assumption is rather conservative in terms of the effects of long-term unemployment.
7
Given its intertemporal nature, the investor’s life-cycle problem is formulated in a recursive
form, writing the value of the optimization problem at the beginning of period t as a
function of the maximized current utility and of the value of the problem at t+1 (Bellman
equation):
Vit (Xit,Pit, sit) = max
{Cit}
T −1
t0
,{αsit}
T −1
t0
(
C1−γit
1− γ
+ βEt [ptVit+1 (Xit+1,Pit+1, sit+1)
+ (1− pt) b
(Xit+1/b)
1−γ
1− γ
])
(8)
s.t. Xit+1 = (Xit − Cit)R
P
it + Yit+1 (9)
At each time t the value function Vit describes the maximized value of the problem as
a function of three state variables: cash on hand at the beginning of time t (Xit), the
stochastic permanent component of income at beginning of t (Pit), and the labor market
state sit = e, u1, u2.
In particular, at the beginning of each period, financial resources available to the individual
for consumption and saving are given by the sum of accumulated financial wealth Wit and
current labor income Yit, i.e. cash on hand Xit = Wit+ Yit.
The labor income and retirement processes are specified in section 2.1. We allow savings
to be invested in a short-term riskless asset, yielding a constant gross real return Rf , and
one risky asset, characterized as “stocks” yielding stochastic gross real returns Rst , for each
period. The excess returns of stocks over the riskless asset follows
Rst −R
f = µs + νst (10)
where µs is the expected stock premium and νst is a normally distributed innovation, with
mean zero and variance σ2s . We do not allow for excess return predictability and other forms
of changing investment opportunities over time, as in Michaelides and Zhang (2017). The
the investor’s portfolio return is:
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RPit = α
s
itR
s
t + (1− α
s
it)R
f (11)
with αsit and (1− α
s
it) denoting the shares of the investor’s portfolio invested in stocks and
in the riskless asset respectively. We do not allow for short sales and we assume that the
investor is liquidity constrained. Consequently, the amounts invested in stocks and in the
riskless asset are non negative in all periods. All simulation results presented below are
derived under the assumption that the investor’s asset menu is the same during working
life and retirement.
This problem has no closed form solution; therefore, we obtain the optimal values for
consumption and portfolio shares, depending on the values of each state variable at each
point in time, by means of numerical techniques 2. To this aim, we apply a backward
induction procedure starting from the last possible period of life T and computing optimal
consumption and portfolio share policy rules for each possible value of the continuous state
variables (Xit, Pit) by means of the standard grid search method.
3 Going backwards, for
every period t = T − 1, T − 2, ..., t0, we use the Bellman equation (8) to obtain optimal
rules for consumption and portfolio shares.
3 Calibration
Parameter calibration concerns investor’s preferences, the features of the labor income
process during working life and retirement, and the moments of the risky asset returns.
For reference, we initially solve the model by abstracting from the unemployment risk as
in Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (2005).
The agent begins her working life at the age of 20 and works for (a maximum of) 45
periods (K) before retiring at the age of 65. After retirement, she can live for a maximum
of 35 periods until the age of 100. In each period, we take the conditional probability
of being alive in the next period pt from the life expectancy tables of the U.S. National
Center for Health Statistics. With regards to preferences, we set the utility discount
2In the online Appendix A, we show how the evolution of the permanent component of labor income
depends on previous individual labor market dynamics.
3The problem is solved over a grid of values covering the space of both the state variables and the
controls in order to ensure that the obtained solution is a global optimum.
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factor β = 0.96 (as in Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout, 2005), and the parameter capturing
the strength of the bequest motive b = 2.5 (as in Gomes and Michaelides, 2005), which
bears the interpretation of the number of years of her descendants’ consumption that the
investor intends to save for. Finally, the benchmark value for the coefficient of relative
risk aversion is γ = 5, much lower than the value typically adopted in the literature. The
riskless (constant) interest rate is set at 0.02, with an expected equity premium µs fixed
at 0.04. The standard deviation of the return innovations is set at σs = 0.157 (as in
Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout, 2005). Finally, we impose a zero correlation between stock
return innovations and aggregate permanent labor income disturbances (ρsY = 0). Table
1 summarizes the benchmark values of relevant parameters with source references.
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Table 1: Calibration parameters
Description Parameter Value Source
Working life 20-65
Retirement 65 -100
Risk aversion γ 5
Replacement ratio λ 0.68 OECD (2015)
Discount factor β 0.96 Cocco et
al. (2005)
Bequest Motive b 2.5 Gomes and
Michaelides (2005)
Variance of permanent shocks to la-
bor income
σ2
ω
0.0106 Cocco et al.
(2005) on PSID
Variance of transitory shocks to la-
bor income
σ2
ǫ
0.0738 Cocco et al.
(2005) on PSID
Riskless rate r 2% Cocco et
al. (2005)
Excess returns on stocks µs 4% Cocco et
al. (2005)
Variance of stock returns innovations σs 0.025 Cocco et
al. (2005)
Stock ret./permanent lab. income
shock correlation
ρsY 0 Cocco et
al. (2015)
Unemployment benefits
Short-term unemployed ξ1 0.3 OECD (2010)
Long-term unemployed ξ2 0.1 OECD (2010)
Human Capital Loss
Short-term unemployed Ψ1 0
Long-term unemployed Ψ2 0.25 Jacobson et
al. (1993a)
This table reports benchmark values of relevant parameters with source reference.
3.1 Labor income and unemployment risk
The labor income process is calibrated using the estimated parameters for U.S. households
with high school education (but not a college degree) in Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout
(2005). For the high school group, the variances of the permanent and transitory shocks
(ωit and εit respectively) are equal to σ
2
ω = 0.0106 and σ
2
ε = 0.0738. After retirement,
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income is a constant proportion λ of the final (permanent) labor income, with λ = 0.68,
as the net replacement rate of total pension benefits for the average earner in the U.S.
(OECD, 2015)4. The age-dependent trend is captured by a third-order polynomial in age
fitted to the age coefficients estimates in Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (2005), delivering
the typical hump-shaped profile until retirement depicted in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Age-Income profile for U.S. high-school educated workers
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The figure reports the age-income profile derived using the calibration in Cocco et al. (2005) for high-school
educated workers.
The resulting labor income process does not capture the evidence in Krueger, Cramer
and Cho (2014) that the long-term unemployed experience a progressive declining re-
employability over time and are more likely to exit the labor force. We use data from
the Current Population Survey (CPS) to calibrate the transition probabilities from em-
ployment to unemployment to reflect the risk of entering unemployment along with the
observed average unemployment rates at different durations. According to the evidence
based on CPS reported in Kroft, Lange, Notowidigdo and Katz (2016), the annual transi-
tion probability from employment to unemployment is 4%. Given the duration dependence
and the steady decline in the annual outflow rate from unemployment to employment dur-
ing the first year of unemployment (Kroft, Lange, Notowidigdo and Katz, 2016), we set
the probability of leaving unemployment after the first year at 85%.
The annual transition probabilities between labor market states are chosen to match the
4For a more realistic Social Security System design and its implications on retirement, consumption
and investment decisions see Hubener, Maurer and Mitchell (2016).
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average annual unemployment rate in the United States:
Πst,st+1 =


0.96 0.04 0
0.85 0 0.15
0.33 0 0.67

 (12)
The assumed transition matrix (12) yields unconditional probabilities of being short-run
(3.8%) and long-run unemployed (1.7%) in line with respect to the 2015 overall (5.5%) and
long-term (1.7%) unemployment rates in the U.S..
In our baseline calibration with “human capital loss” we assume a non-negligible human
capital depreciation following a 2-year unemployment spell. While Ψ1 is kept at 0, Ψ2 is
increased up to 0.25, implying a 25% loss of the individual permanent labor income com-
ponent after the second year of unemployment, which captures the long-lasting effects of
protracted inactivity on job careers. Well-established empirical evidence on job displace-
ment shows that job losses affect earnings far beyond the unemployment spell, though the
range of the estimated effects varies considerably. For example, the estimates for immedi-
ate losses following displacement may range from 30% (Couch and Placzek, 2010) to 40%
of earnings (Jacobson, Lalonde and Sullivan, 1993b). Earnings losses are shown to be per-
sistent in a range from 15% (Couch and Placzek, 2010) to about 25% (Jacobson, LaLonde
and Sullivan, 1993a) of their pre-displacement levels. These estimates abstract from the
effect of unemployment duration, while Cooper (2013) finds that earnings losses are larger
the longer unemployment lasts. Also, based on administrative data, Jacobson, LaLonde
and Sullivan (2005) estimate that average earnings losses for displaced workers amount
to 43-66% of their predisplacement wage and Guevenen, Karahn, Ozkan and Song (2017)
estimate that the median earnings loss after a full year nonemplyment amounts to 50%
of the predisplacement wage. Overall, compared with the body of existing evidence, our
choice of Ψ2 = 0.25 is relatively conservative, being well in the range of available estimates
of earning losses in the literature. Given the relevance of the human capital loss effect in
our model, we consider a wider range of alternative values for Ψ2 = 0.25 in section 4.2.1
below.
Unemployment benefits are calibrated according to the U.S. unemployment insurance sys-
tem (OECD, 2010). In particular, considering that the replacement rate with respect to
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last labor income is on average low and state benefits are paid for a maximum of 26 weeks,
we set ξ1 = 0.3 in case of short-term unemployment spells and set a smaller value of
ξ2 = 0.1 for the long-term unemployed.
4 Results
In this section, we discuss the results from the baseline calibration case where unemploy-
ment causes human capital loss and compare them with findings obtained in two alternative
scenarios. The first is the “no unemployment risk” scenario and corresponds to the stan-
dard life-cycle set up with piee = 1 and all other entries equal to zero in the transition
probability matrix (2). In addition, to highlight the effects of permanent consequences
of unemployment on future earnings prospects, we consider a second scenario by adding
the unemployment risk embedded in the transition probability matrix (12) with no human
capital loss (as in Bremus and Kuzin , 2014). In this “unemployment with no human cap-
ital loss” scenario, unemployment has no permanent consequences on future earnings (i.e.
Ψ1 = Ψ2 = 0) but entails only a cut in current income. This case closely corresponds to
the set-up studied by Bremus and Kuzin (2014), who focus only on temporary effects of
long-term unemployment.
4.1 Life-Cycle Profiles
On the basis of the optimal policy functions (described in the online Appendix B), we simu-
late the whole life-cycle consumption and investment decisions for 10,000 agents. Figure 2,
panel (a), shows the average optimal stock shares plotted against age when unemployment
risk is ignored and when it is accounted for. In the case of no unemployment risk (dotted
line), the well-known result on the age profile of optimal stock portfolio shares is obtained.
Over the life cycle the proportion of overall wealth implicitly invested in the riskless asset
through human capital declines with age. Consequently, at early stages of the life cycle,
optimal stock investment is about 100% and decreases with age to reach around 80% at
retirement. When unemployment risk without human capital loss is considered (dashed
line), the optimal portfolio share of stocks still declines with age, though being slightly
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lower at all ages, with a 100% optimal stock share only for very young investors.
However, when long-term unemployment implies a rare but large skill loss (solid line),
the optimal stock investment is sizably reduced at any age and almost flat, at around
55-65%. The risk of permanently losing a substantial portion of future labor income
prospects reduces the level of human capital and increases its riskiness. Because this effect
is particularly relevant for younger workers, it induces a lower optimal stock investment
conditional on financial wealth especially when young. Consequently, the age profile re-
mains remarkably flat over the whole working life.5 These results highlight that possible
long-run consequences of unemployment significantly dampen the incentive to invest in
stocks, under standard calibrations, whereas unemployment persistence, with only tempo-
rary income losses as in Bremus and Kuzin (2014), has almost no effect on the age profile
of optimal portfolio composition.
The reduction in the optimal portfolio share allocated to stocks is due to higher wealth
accumulation, in turn induced by larger precautionary savings.6 Panel (b) of Figure 2
displays the average financial wealth accumulated over the life cycle for the three scenarios
considered. In the face of possible, albeit rare, human capital depreciation, individuals
accumulate substantially more financial wealth during working life to buffer possible dis-
astrous labor market outcomes. Optimal consumption when young consequently falls, but
it is much higher during both late working years and retirement years.
5The relatively low investment in stocks during retirement is due to the presence of a positive bequest
motive, common to all parameterization considered in this paper.
6Love (2006) shows that higher unemployment insurance benefits reduce calibrated contributions to
pension funds by the young, suggesting that precautionary savings when young is due to unemployment
risk.
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Figure 2: Life-cycle profiles of stock share and financial wealth
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This figure displays the mean simulated stock investment and financial wealth accumulation life-cycle
profiles. Age ranges from 20 to 100. The three cases correspond to no unemployment risk (dotted line);
unemployment risk with no human capital loss (dashed line); unemployment risk with human capital loss
(solid line). In the latter case, the parameters governing the human capital loss during short-term and
long-term unemployment spells are Ψ1 = 0 and Ψ2 = 0.25. Financial wealth is expressed in ten thousands
of U.S. dollars.
Figure 3 displays the life-cycle profile of the ratio between savings and total (financial plus
labor) income, comparing the case without unemployment risk to the one with unemploy-
ment and human capital loss. When the worker is 20 years old, the average propensity to
save is especially high in the latter case, reaching 0.8 compared with less than 0.2 when
unemployment risk is absent. Such propensity monotonically decreases in age, converging
to the known pattern when the worker is in her forties. The figure clearly depicts the
impact on savings of the resolution of uncertainty as individuals age.
Consistent with these predictions, data on Norwegian households show that they accumu-
late additional savings and shift toward safe assets in the years prior to unemployment and
deplete savings after the job loss (Basten, Fagereng and Telle, 2016). Importantly, our re-
sults imply that labor market institutions targeted to long-term unemployment affect both
risk taking in the equity market and precautionary saving. The expectation of a higher
benefit may mitigate the adverse impact of long term unemployment on human capital,
reducing the need for cautious investing and saving during working life. The variation of
institutions across countries may thus generate different life-cycle patterns in equity in-
vesting. In this light, the decreasing stock holdings in Norwegian data (Fagereng, Gottlieb
and Guiso, 2017) may be a consequence of higher long-term unemployment benefits with
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respect to the U.S..
Figure 3: Life-cycle profiles of savings rate
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This figure displays the savings dynamics for individuals of age 20 to 100, relative to total income (i.e.
labor income plus financial income). The two cases correspond to no unemployment risk (dotted line) and
unemployment risk with human capital loss: Ψ1 = 0 and Ψ2 = 0.25 (solid line).
4.1.1 Human capital loss intensity and labor income growth rate
We now check the sensitivity of life-cycle profiles with respect to the magnitude of the
human capital loss effect due to long-term unemployment, captured by the parameter Ψ2
(set equal to 0.25 in our baseline calibration) and to the age-income profile.
Human capital loss intensity. Since, as discussed in Section 3, available estimates
of earnings losses due to long-term unemployment are as low as 15% of the level of pre-
displacement earnings, Figure 4 shows the results of an experiment with the human capital
loss parameter Ψ2 in the range 0.15 − 0.30. Even when the parameter falls to 0.15, the
flattening in the portfolio share of stocks is maintained over working life around an average
of 70%.
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Figure 4: Sensitivity to human capital loss
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This figure displays the average simulated stock investment and financial wealth accumulation life-cycle
profiles for individuals of age 20 to 100. Alternative values of human capital loss during unemployment
are considered: Ψ2 ranging from 0.15 to 0.30, and in all cases Ψ1 = 0. Financial wealth is expressed in
ten thousands of U.S. dollars.
Shape of the income profile. To highlight the role of the risk of human capital loss in
determining a flattening of stock investing over the life cycle, we next consider different
deterministic income profiles, shown in Figure 5. In particular, we focus on two alternative
profiles (one flat, and one steeply rising until mid-working life) that imply the same present
discounted value of income at age 20 as the hump-shaped profile used in our benchmark
calibration. Figure 6 displays the resulting portfolio stock shares and financial wealth
accumulation paths. The finding of a relatively flat age pattern of the risky share over
working life is robust. When deterministic labor income is flat, both wealth accumulation
and optimal stock investment follow very closely the pattern obtained in the hump-shaped
case. In the event of a steeper labor income profile, with larger earnings occurring in
the later part of working years, the young investor faces a greater risk of human capital
loss, that makes him to invest less in stocks than in the benchmark case. The risky
share is then moderately adjusted upwards along working life, as the gradual resolution
of uncertainty concerning labor and pension income compensates the hedging effect. The
portfolio rebalancing toward stocks becomes more pronounced in the final part of working
activity, since the risk of human capital loss due to long-run unemployment is reduced and
a certain (and relatively high) pension income is coming closer.
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Figure 5: Alternative age-income profiles
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This figure displays hypothetical stylized age-income profiles that imply the same present discounted
value of income at age 20. The benchmark is the labor income profile of U.S. high-school educated workers
estimated in Cocco et al. (2005).
Figure 6: Life-cycle profiles with unemployment and human capital loss: different
income profiles
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This figure displays the average simulated stock investment and financial wealth accumulation life-cycle
profiles for individuals of age 20 to 100, in case of different deterministic age-profiles of labor income. The
benchmark computed considering the labor income profile for U.S. high school educated workers estimated
in Cocco et al. (2005). In all cases the human capital loss is considered (Ψ1 = 0 and Ψ2 = 0.25). Financial
wealth is expressed in ten thousands of U.S. dollars.
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4.1.2 Heterogeneity
The above results imply that the optimal stock investment is flat in age, even for a mod-
erately risk averse worker. In the face of a very rare but non-negligible human capital
depreciation, workers on average invest about 55% of their financial wealth in stocks.
This average pattern may hide considerable differences across agents. The present section
investigates the distribution across agents of both conditional optimal stock share and
accumulated wealth.
The case of no unemployment risk is displayed in panel (a) of Figure 7, which shows the
25th, 50th and 75th percentiles of the distributions. Both the optimal stock share and the
stock of accumulated financial wealth are highly heterogeneous across workers as well as
retirees. The exception is young workers as they tilt their entire portfolio towards stocks
given the relatively riskless nature of their human capital. Heterogeneity of portfolio
shares depends on the shape and movements through age of the policy functions displayed
in Figure B.1 (see, Appendix B), relating optimal stock shares to the amount of available
cash on hand. Relatively steep policy functions imply that even small differences in the
level of accumulated wealth result in remarkably different asset allocation choices. At the
early stage of the life cycle, when accumulated financial wealth is modest, it is optimal for
everybody to be fully invested in stocks. As investors grow older, different realizations of
background risk induce large differences in savings and wealth accumulation. This situation
pushes investors on the steeper portion of their policy functions and determines a gradual
increase in the heterogeneity of optimal risky portfolio shares during their working life.
After retirement, investors decumulate their financial wealth relatively slowly, due to the
bequest motive, and still move along the steeper portion of their relevant policy functions;
as a consequence, the dispersion of optimal shares tends to persist.
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Figure 7: Life-cycle percentile profiles
(a) No unemployment risk
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(b) Unemployment risk with human capital loss
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This figure displays the distribution (25th, 50th and 75th percentiles) of simulated stock investment and
financial wealth accumulation life-cycle profiles for individuals of age 20 to 100 in the case of no unem-
ployment risk (panel (a)) and of unemployment risk with human capital loss (panel (b)). The parameters
governing the human capital loss during short-term and long-term unemployment spells are Ψ1 = 0 and
Ψ2 = 0.25. Financial wealth is expressed in ten thousands of U.S. dollars.
Panel (b) of Figure 7 displays the life-cycle distribution of stock share and financial wealth
with unemployment risk and human capital loss. Compared with the case of no unem-
ployment risk, the distribution of optimal stock shares is much less heterogeneous over the
whole life cycle. In particular, heterogeneity shrinks during working life even for young
workers, given the high human capital risk they bear at the beginning of their careers.
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In case of unemployment risk, policy functions are relatively flat (see, Figure B.1 in Ap-
pendix B) implying that even large differences in the level of accumulated wealth result
in homogenous asset allocation choices. Then, as in the previous case, the shape of het-
erogeneity of stock shares and accumulated financial wealth over the life cycle is due to
different realizations of background risk.
5 Robustness
This section sheds additional light on the strength of our results, that radically depart
from the accepted wisdom concerning optimal life-cycle behavior during working years.
A first robustness check concerns the sensitivity of our results to a lower probability of
experiencing long-term unemployment. In performing such analysis, we also allow for an
asymmetric reduction in the probability of long-term unemployment with respect to work-
ers’ age. Recent data from U.S. labor market statistics indeed show that the composition
of long-term unemployment is shifting towards the elderly. In 2015 the overall and the
long-term unemployment rates in U.S. were about 5.5% and 1.7%, respectively, with the
share of long-term unemployment in the overall unemployment rate differing widely among
age groups: from 20% among young workers (16-24 years old), to 35% among prime age
workers (25-55), and up to 41% among older workers (over 55).
A second check regards the modelling of the link between unemployment risk during work-
ing life and retirement income, so as to make sure that our results do not depend on
long-term unemployment occurring during the very last working years, which heavily re-
duces retirement income. The robustness to alternative values of the pension replacement
ratio and of long-term unemplyment benefit provisions is also assessed.
Finally, we evaluate the robustness of our main results to alternative calibrations of key
preference parameters: the subjective discount factor and the degree of risk aversion.7.
7Further, since the power utility function used in our life-cycle model implies that the worker is indiffer-
ent to intertemporal correlation of consumption shocks (Bommier, 2007), we adopt Epstein-Zin preferences
to investigate whether positive correlation aversion boosts the impact of unemployment with human capi-
tal loss. A similar motivation leads us to analyse the sensitivity of the equity-investment profile to positive
correlation between stock returns and labor income shocks. Results are reported in the online Appendix
C.
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5.1 Age-dependent unemployment risk
In this section, we calibrate our model with human capital loss, allowing for both a smaller
and age-dependent long-term unemployment risk. We change the transition probability
from short-term to long-term unemployment, denoted as piu1u2 in the following transition
probabilities matrix:
Πst,st+1 =


0.96 0.04 0
1− piu1u2 0 piu1u2
0.33 0 0.67


with respect to the baseline calibration in (12) where piu1u2 = 0.15 irrespective of the
worker’s age. We consider two cases. In “case 1”, the probability of entering long-term
unemployment is reduced by one third (from 0.15 to 0.10) only for workers younger than
50 years old. In “case 2”, we further reduce the probability of entering long-term un-
employment for very young workers, setting piu1u2 = 0.075 for workers less than 30 years
old. In all scenarios, transition probabilities are rather conservative implying steady-state
long-term unemployment rates lower than the actual one. For reference, in the baseline
case, the steady-state long-term unemployment rate is 1.7%, while it is 1.1% and 0.8%, in
case 1 and 2, respectively.
Figure 8 reports the life-cycle profiles for the optimal conditional stock holding and financial
wealth accumulation when long-term unemployment risk is age-dependent. Compared with
the baseline case, the age profile of stock investment is only slightly modified. A lower long-
term unemployment risk at young ages implies a moderately higher stock share during
prime age but it does not significantly alter investors’ behavior later over the working life
and during retirement. In addition, it has virtually no effect on wealth accumulation.
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Figure 8: Life-cycle profiles with unemployment and human capital loss: age-
dependent long-term unemployment risk
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This figure displays the average simulated stock investment and financial wealth accumulation life-cycle
profiles for individuals of age 20 to 100. The probability of entering long-term unemployment for an
unemployed worker is set to 0.15 in the benchmark case, to 0.10 only for workers younger than 50 in Case
1, to 0.075 for workers younger than 30 in Case 2. Human capital loss: Ψ1 = 0 and Ψ2 = 0.25. Financial
wealth is expressed in ten thousands of U.S. dollars.
5.2 Unemployment risk and retirement income
In our model, pension benefits are a fixed proportion of the last labor income earned
prior to retirement age. Such income is especially sensitive to human capital loss due
to the occurrence of long-term unemployment in years just before retirement. Thus, we
analyse whether our results are robust to changes in modelling the link between long-term
unemployment at old ages and subsequent pension provisions. In addition, we consider
different values of social security and long-term unemployment benefit replacement rates.
Timing of long-term unemployment. To begin with, we assume no human capital
loss in the event that unemployment occurs in the years immediately before retirement.
The flattening of the optimal stock share profile carries over to this setting, suggesting
that it is not an artifact of how we model pension income. In a second check, we take the
solution of our original model (calibrated in the case of unemployment risk with human
capital loss) and focus on simulated life-cycle profiles for two selected groups of agents.
The first group includes workers who have experienced just one long-term unemployment
spell of 5 years over the entire working life at the beginning of their job career (i.e., before
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the age of 35), whereas the other group contains workers who have experienced just one
long-term unemployment spell of 5 years over their entire working life but at the end of
their career (i.e., after the age of 60). We find that in both cases, average life-cycle stock
share profiles exhibit the flattening property. This experiment confirms that the flattening
is due to the riskier nature of human capital, together with the resolution of uncertainty
during working age, and it is not affected by specific assumptions on the determinants of
pension income.
Social security and unemployment benefit replacement rates. In addition, we
consider two extreme values for the pension benefits replacement rates, 40% and 85%, to
reflect the wide range of Social Security Systems’ generosity around the world (OECD,
2015). Figure 9 shows that if the pension replacement rate falls to 40% (rises to 85%),
anticipating relatively low (high) pension incomes, the consumer will need to accumulate
more (less) financial wealth to smooth consumption over retirement. This only slightly
affects the optimal share of stocks over working life while it lowers (increases) it dur-
ing retirement, due to the lower (larger) amount of human capital embedded in pension
benefits.
Figure 9: Life-cycle profiles with unemployment and human capital loss: pension
benefits replacement rate
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This figure displays the average simulated stock investment and financial wealth accumulation life-cycle
profiles for individuals of age 20 to 100. The net replacement rate of total pension benefits ranges from
0.4 to 0.85. Human capital loss: Ψ1 = 0 and Ψ2 = 0.25. Financial wealth is expressed in ten thousands of
U.S. dollars.
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Finally, we assess the robustness of our benchmark results to a different value of the
long-term unemployment benefit provision, setting ξ2 = 0; in this case, only short-term
unemployed workers receive benefits. Figure 10 shows that the portfolio risky share main-
tains a relatively flat age profile, with a moderately increasing pattern over the earlier part
of the investor’s working life.
Figure 10: Life-cycle profiles with unemployment and human capital loss: unem-
ployment benefits replacement rate
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This figure displays the average simulated stock investment and financial wealth accumulation life-cycle
profiles for individuals of age 20 to 100. The replacement rate of long-term unemployment benefits (ξ2)
takes values 0.1 (benchmark) and 0. Human capital loss: Ψ2 = 0.25. Financial wealth is expressed in ten
thousands of U.S. dollars.
5.3 Preference parameters
Finally, we assess the robustness of our results to alternative formulations of key preference
parameters, namely the subjective discount factor and the degree of risk aversion and report
results in Figures 11 and 12.
Subjective discount factor. Individuals with a low subjective discount factor value cur-
rent consumption relatively more than future consumption in comparison with individuals
with a high discount factor. As shown in Figure 11, this leads, ceteris paribus, to a lower
accumulation of financial wealth, and to a negligible effect on the optimal stock investing
during working life. During retirement, the absence of human capital risk combined with
the slower wealth decumulation induces an increase in the financial risk exposure. In addi-
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tion, a discount factor equal to 0.85 implies, in our model, a wealth-to-income ratio in line
with the value of 4.2 observed in recent U.S. data.8 As in Fagereng, Gottlieb and Guiso
(2017), this value is lower than the one calibrated in the standard life-cycle consumption
and portfolio models but coherent with models of buffer stock savings (Deaton, 1991).
Figure 11: Life-cycle profiles with unemployment and human capital loss: discount
rate
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This figure displays the average simulated stock investment and financial wealth accumulation life-cycle
profiles for individuals of age 20 to 100. Different values of β are considered: 0.96 (benchmark case), 0.9
and 0.85. Human capital loss: Ψ1 = 0 and Ψ2 = 0.25. Financial wealth is expressed in ten thousands of
U.S. dollars.
Risk aversion. The critical parameter in the CRRA utility function is the risk aversion
coefficient γ, that we set equal to the relatively low value of 5 in our benchmark calibration.
Here we assess the sensitivity of our results to different values of γ. Not surprisingly,
the investment in risky assets over the life cycle depends importantly on relative risk
aversion. In particular, the risk of experiencing the permanent consequences of long-term
unemployment induces more risk averse investors to invest a substantially lower fraction
of their financial wealth in equity without affecting the flat age profile (Figure 12).
8Survey of Consumer Finances, 2013.
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Figure 12: Life-cycle profiles with unemployment and human capital loss: relative
risk aversion
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This figure displays the average simulated stock investment and financial wealth accumulation life-cycle
profiles for individuals of age 20 to 100. Preferences over consumption are CRRA, with relative risk
aversion of 5 (benchmark), 8 and 10. Human capital loss: Ψ1 = 0 and Ψ2 = 0.25. Financial wealth is
expressed in ten thousands of U.S. dollars.
6 Conclusions
As the recent Great Recession episode highlighted, long-term unemployment spells may
persistently damage workers’ human capital. Against this backdrop, this paper investigates
the effects of human capital loss on life-cycle savings and portfolio choice. This method-
ological innovation delivers new insights. Even a small probability of experiencing human
capital loss due to long-term unemployment can generate optimal conditional stock shares
more in line with those observed in the data. Because of the possibility of human capital
loss, young workers face higher uncertainty concerning future income and social security
pension levels than older ones. At the same time, young workers with continuous careers
have larger human capital than older workers. When a highly unlikely unemployment spell
may potentially lead to considerable human capital loss, the first effect offsets the second
and the optimal investment in stocks is relatively flat over the life cycle. This result departs
from the implications of previous models and highlights the importance of human capital
loss in shaping life-cycle portfolios.
Our calibrations also suggest an alternative, more balanced, design for target-date invest-
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ment funds that would fit different kinds of workers, given the limited heterogeneity in
life-cycle optimal investment policies induced by the threat of human capital losses. More
generally, our analysis implies that the pattern of risk-taking at different ages in target-date
funds should be related to the share of uninsured long-term unemployment risk, and that
important differences should be observed in the life-cycle profile of household portfolios,
both across cohorts and across countries, in response to the extent of long-term unemploy-
ment insurance. For example, our results are consistent with the decreasing age profile of
the conditional shock share in a country such as Norway, where the net replacement rate
for the long-term unemployed has traditionally been fairly high (Fagereng, Gottlieb and
Guiso, 2017).
As a final consideration, we acknowledge that there exist sources of possible human capital
loss (such as illness, accidents, personal bankruptcy) other than long-term unemployment,
as well as other partial insurance vehicles. The optimal flat asset allocation will extend
to such scenarios to the degree that those additional shocks remain partially uninsured by
additional hedges and that they have worse consequences the earlier in life they hit the
worker.
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Supplementary material
Supplementary material associated with this article can be found in the online version.
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